As Yemen teeters on the brink of civil war and anarchy, U.S. Mideast policy remains frustratingly unclear. Failure to fully engage in the dramatic events unfolding in Yemen could lead to harsh consequences for America and its allies for years to come.
Last week, Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, wounded in an attack and suffering burns over 40 percent of his body, was forced to flee the country for medical treatment in neighboring Saudi Arabia. Yemenis celebrated on the streets of the capitol, Sana'a, when news of the president's departure was made public. Mass demonstrations demanding Saleh's resignation have been occurring since February.
President Saleh has ruled his country for over three decades. Opposition forces hope that Yemen will follow in the footsteps of Tunisia and Egypt and dislodge their despotic leader. Presidential spokespersons, however, are promising that Saleh will return to Yemen within days, after he has been able to recuperate. Saleh has left his son and nephews behind in Yemen to facilitate his return to Sana'a to reclaim day-to-day authority.
Yemeni vice president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi now serves as acting president, initially with the approval of the main opposition parties. Hadi met with U.S .ambassador Gerald Feierstein to discuss how the Sana'a government could cooperate more with the opposition. However, Hadi ultimately rejected any discussions with the opposition until Saleh's return. It is unclear how much real authority Hadi has in Saleh's absence, given the presence of Saleh relatives and loyalists in the securities and intelligence forces.
As Saleh seeks treatment for his wounds, Saudi Arabia's role as regional power broker has come into question. In recent months, the Saudi government has been unable to broker and implement a transition plan for its unstable and volatile neighbor. A Saudi-negotiated ceasefire was effective in Sana'a, but fighting still occurred in outlying areas of the country.
Yemen has historically posed an uncomfortable threat to Saudi Arabia along its southern border. Fears of Shia rebels in Yemen linking up with Iranian supporters have meant that the Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in any governmental transition within Yemen.
As a result, the Saudi royal family is reported to have funded competing tribal leaders to have maximum influence over the domestic political situation.
The difficult question to address, however, is whether Yemen would actually become a much more significant threat to U.S. and European security if Saleh were to resign. There is a real risk that in the absence of Saleh a power vacuum could emerge, and if faced with a civil war, a real risk that Yemen could spiral into anarchy and become a failed state. Unfortunately, U.S. foreign policy in the region remains inconsistent and unpredictable. The U.S.'s most sustained engagement in the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of the Arab Spring has been arguably where it least impacts American interests in the short, medium and long term: Libya.
With Col. Moammar Gadhafi proving to be much harder to locate and dislodge than initially anticipated, European leaders now openly concede that military operations in Libya will continue well into 2012. Rhetoric about a steadily weakening Gadhafi regime still circulates, but there is little clarity about realistic future timetables.
As a result, Yemen languishes in an American blind spot.
Despite formulaic encouragements that Yemen should transfer power through constitutional procedures, American officials appear uncertain about how to directly or indirectly engage the competing parties. Instead, the Obama administration appears more comfortable relying on armed drone attacks and fighter raids that seek to target terrorist camps, than with the much more difficult requirements of attempting to coordinate a meaningful diplomatic solution. Should the Saudis eventually lose patience with Saleh and entice him into retirement with promises of a comfortable pension and immunity from prosecution, the U.S. must decide how best to facilitate a transition towards peace and stability in a way that does not leave Yemen wide open to extremist, Islamist forces.
Unfortunately, the U.S. now has little influence over the course of Yemeni affairs. Despite the reported cost of $300 million per year in aid to Saleh's government, and the renewed covert military campaign targeting al-Qaida suspects, the Obama administration frustratingly possesses almost no real leverage over either the government or the opposition, especially when compared to Saudi Arabian influence in the country.
Although the consequences of escalating the covert attacks to a direct military engagement would be a bloody affair, relying simply on sanctions and intermittent rhetoric cannot be expected to force Saleh out, or ensure stability after his departure.
Syria and Bahrain clearly demonstrates the limited effectiveness of these U.S. policies. Instead, the U.S. and its allies must be able to propose, and advocate persuasively for, a comprehensive approach to resolving the numerous tribal, ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the region that have to date been stifled and obscured. A Yemen that disintegrates into chaos and lawlessness would pose tremendous security risks to both Western countries and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
The time for doing nothing has passed.